real-wage differentials between the urban modern sector and rural areas that are the major causes of much current LDC urban unemployment. To the extent that the artificially high urban wages also discourage the use of labor-intensive processes (see Sec. II), then urban unemployment and high capital-labor ratios are both parallel consequences of the high wages, but neither is the direct cause of the other.
Finally, in a normal, well-functioning economy we expect manufacturing employment to grow less rapidly than manufacturing output because of capital deepening and technological change.4 Thus the observation of a differential in growth rates should not by itself be a cause for concern. But the very large differentials that are observed5-much larger than could be accounted for by human-capital deepening and exogenous technological change-combined with the introduction of capital-intensive manufacturing facilities with capital-labor ratios far above the existing averages in the LDCs6 (at the same time that high urban unemployment rates indicate that physical-capital deepening ought not to be occurring) do indicate that the manufacturing sectors in many LDCs are not functioning properly.
But are there efficient alternatives to the high capital-labor ratios? It is to that evidence that we now turn.
I. Alternative Factor Proportions: The Evidence
The belief that capital-intensive manufacturing processes similar to those found in developed countries are the correct ones for LDCs was quite strong in the 1950s and 1960s, especially among engineers and even some economists. The major argument in favor of them was that they 4 Only if technological change were in a strong labor-using direction would employment be able to keep pace with output.
5 See, e.g., the data in Morawetz (n. 1 above). 6 See, e.g., the essays by David Morawetz, C. Peter Timmer, and Louis T. were simply more efficient than more labor-intensive alternatives; the latter, it was claimed, would always use more labor and more capital per unit of output than would the process with the high capital-labor ratio. Thus, though alternatives might exist in a technical sense, they would always be found to be inferior.7 This could also be characterized as a belief in fixed proportions (as opposed to factor substitutability), since the efficient factor combination is fixed at the proportions found in developed countries. The identification of efficiency with "productivity" (i.e., labor productivity) by many international study groups and productivity missions in the 1950s and 1960s helped contribute to this view.8 Though low labor productivity could be due to pure inefficiency (e.g., bad managerial supervision, bad organization of work tasks, etc.), it could also be due to the efficient combination of labor with low levels of capital in poor countries. The confusion of labor productivity with efficiency meant that high capital-labor ratios would be associated with efficiency.
Another strand of argument has claimed that efficient alternatives might exist for some processes but that the alternatives are limited, and hence in practical terms most LDCs are faced with little or no alternatives to high capital-labor ratios for most manufacturing processes.9 Or it is argued that high levels of mechanization are necessary to ensure high levels of quality (e.g., in machined products) or can substitute for managerial skills in organizing and supervising workers, skills which are even in shorter supply in most LDCs than is capital.10 A completely different line of argument favoring capital-intensive technologies has rested on alleged saving and reinvestment rates by different economic groups. As argued by Galenson and Leibenstein, capital-intensive technologies would mean high returns to capital, and capital owners have higher saving and reinvestment rates than do workers."1 Hence, even though there might be efficient labor-intensive methods available, capital-intensive methods should be chosen because reinvestment would be greater and the pace of industrialization would proceed faster. This argument clearly hinges on empirical evidence concerning saving rates by different groups, a topic to which we shall return later in this section. 12 We now turn to the evidence. In one sense, it is easy to provide evidence that developed country capital-labor ratios are not the only alternatives available. A glance at any LDC industrial census which contains capital data will reveal capital-labor ratios that are usually a third of those in the United States.13 This is in spite of the fact that LDC rates of capacity utilization are frequently below that found in the United States, thus raising the LDC capital-labor ratios above what they would be with better capacity utilization (and hence more labor employed)."4 But a believer in the superior efficiency of capital-intensive methods would probably not be convinced by this kind of evidence. He or she might well argue that the LDC methods are inefficient (old, antiquated, improperly conceived) and/or that the overmanning of otherwise efficient capital equipment is occurring because of employment pressures in LDCs; protectionist policies in LDCs buffer these inefficient production units from more efficient competition from internal or external sources. Or a believer might argue that the LDC methods are efficient only for the small size of the LDC markets and that larger volumes could be produced more efficiently with more capital-intensive methods. (This scale argument is one to which we shall return below.) Accordingly, a more systematic investigation than just a casual perusal of LDC industrial censuses is needed. We shall examine a number of different kinds of evidence.
Econometric Investigations of Factor Substitution
A large number of articles use LDC data, usually from industrial censuses, to try to measure the degree of substitutability between capital and labor. All of the efforts involve measurements of the elasticity of substitution in a CES production function involving capital and labor. Since the CES production function is nonlinear and cannot be estimated through ordinary least-squares estimation techniques and since data on capital is frequently not available or not considered reliable, an indirect method is used. If the logarithm of output (or, usually, value added) per worker is regressed against the logarithm of the wage, the coefficient on the latter variable is an estimate of the elasticity of substitution. Most studies use this form. (Some of the studies use a direct demand for labor formulation, in which labor is regressed against the wage, output, and other variables.) A few regress the output-capital ratio against the return to capital (both in logarithms), or they regress the capitallabor ratio against the wage alone or against the ratio of the wage to the return to capital (again in logarithms) to provide alternative estimates. These estimates have been made for the whole of manufacturing in single countries and for individual sectors within manufacturing, for both time series and cross sections, and for cross sections for sectors across different countries. As of this writing, these studies have been done for at least 25 LDCs.15
The estimates of the elasticity of substitution are, with only a few exceptions, positive, indicating (if one accepts the methodology as valid) that efficient factor substitutability is possible and that the fixed-proportions view of the world is incorrect.16 The estimates tend to clump between 0.5 and 1.2, but some studies find values appreciably above and below these values. Cross-section studies tend to find higher elasticities than do time-series studies.
The problems of these studies-in concepts, data, and econometric techniques-have been reviewed by a number of authors.17 The data are bad, the CES form may not be the correct one, the time-series studies may not include lags properly, the profit-maximization assumption may not be a good one, the assumption of competitive markets is surely not true, all firms may not be using the same technology, the cross-country studies may not use the correct exchange rates, the crosssection observations (especially across countries) may not be using comparable industries, the level of capacity utilization is usually not held constant, all labor and all capital are assumed to be uniform and to be the only factors of production. These are only some of the problems.18 It is easy to be skeptical of the results. Pack, for example, has argued that the time-series regressions may just be showing that value added per worker increases as capacity utilization increases and as simple technological improvements occur over time, and that wages increase as workers succeed in capturing some of that increase in productivity. Thus, rather than showing a causality between substitution away from labor and wages, the regressions may be showing a reverse causality between wages and increasing productivity.19 Cross-section regressions may be capturing a similar effect, as could the regressions using capital- Leaving aside, then, the data and econometric problems which are always present to a greater or lesser degree in any empirical work, one's evaluation of the worth of these regressions does hinge crucially on how one views the causality between wages and capital-labor ratios. If one already believes that capital-labor ratios are efficiently flexible and that entrepreneurs do respond to factor price incentives, then the results of the regressions provide additional support for this view; making labor more expensive and capital cheaper tends to cause factor substitution toward greater capital intensity. On the other hand, if one believes that efficient factor proportions are more or less fixed (and that observed differences are largely due to random elements or to pressures for increased employment) and/or that wages respond to higher levels of productivity, then the regressions may not support the claim of substitutability. In my view, both effects are probably occurring, and the econometric evidence probably does give some support for the position that efficient labor-intensive alternatives for manufacturing exist. But this is probably more an act of faith than a hard conclusion from incontrovertible evidence. The believers in fixed proportions are unlikely to be convinced.
Engineering or Process-Analysis Studies
In these kinds of studies, researchers investigate individual manufacturing processes or individual products. The investigators usually use engineering or other technical information to determine the inputs necessary to produce a given volume of products (or to process a given volume of manufactured items). A principal part of the investigation is to see if there are alternative means of producing that same volume; that is, if more workers and fewer machines (or, usually, simpler and cheaper machines) can produce the same volume as fewer workers and more machines. This is, of course, the heart of the substitutability question.21
Published evidence exists for only a dozen products and processes,22 but an important result emerges consistently: factor substitutability is possible, and the differences in factor ratios can be quite substantial. A study by Timmer of rice milling and marketing systems found four efficient alternatives, of which the most capital-intensive required $65,000 investment per worker and the most labor-intensive required only $700 per worker.23 An ECLA study of cotton textiles reported by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) showed a choice of efficient techniques ranging from $6,600 to $21,500 investment per worker;24 a later study by Pack argued that the lower limit is closer to $1,100 per worker.25 Further, Pack was able to relate the efficient factor combinations observed in operation to the wage rates and returns on capital also present and thus was able to calculate elasticities of substitution. Of six industries observed, all had positive elasticities of substitution, and five were above 1.0.
Of course, not all technically efficient factor combinations, even labor-intensive ones, would be economically efficient for LDCs. Just as a factor combination could be too capital-intensive, it could also be too labor-intensive. In fact, however, in virtually all cases, at realistic opportunity-cost wage and interest rates for LDCs, labor-intensive or intermediate alternatives are economically sensible. The LDCs do not appear to be limited to current developed country capital-intensive methods.
There are some limits to these studies and some unanswered questions, however. First, only two studies have investigated the relationship between economies of scale and optimal factor proportions; they find (for metal machining and for cement-block manufacture) that there are appreciable economies of scale and that capital-intensive methods are necessary to capture these economies.26 Thus at low volumes there are efficient alternatives, and relative wage and interest costs should determine the proper technique. As volume increases, input levels grow more slowly so that unit costs fall (for any wage and interest rate), but this happens to a greater degree for capital-intensive processes. At very high volumes, the capital-intensive processes dominate so that at any wage or interest rate it makes economic sense to choose the capital-intensive process. The lower the wage, however, the higher the volume at which the switch from the labor-intensive to the capital-intensive processes should occur.
Why economies of scale should favor capital-intensive processes is unclear; this just seems to be a fact of technological nature for the par-ticular processes investigated. To what extent can this be generalized? Most of the investigators of product technology do not mention it, and this may well be a phenomenon restricted in significance to only some of the processes that go into manufacturing a product, like metal finishing, and flow processes involving liquids, pipes, and containers, like petroleum refining and chemical production. The importance of settingup costs for a production run or of the surface area and volume relationship of containers dominates here.27 For other manufacturing processes, scale effects seem likely to be much less important. (This appears especially true of the peripheral activities mentioned in the next section.) Clearly, though, much more needs to be known about the relationship between scale and factor substitutability.
For a product that does embody significant scale effects, LDCs face a dilemma.28 The small-market LDC can achieve appropriate factor proportions but has high unit costs (but, it must be emphasized, the LDC would have yet higher unit costs if it switched to the capital-intensive method); the large-market LDC has lower unit costs but high capital intensity.29 Only research leading to new technologies that would decrease the importance of scale effects or would have them apply equally to labor-intensive methods offers a way out of this dilemma.
A second open question in these studies is the problem of quality. Are capital-intensive processes necessary to ensure high quality? Stewart argues that this is the case for cement blocks.30 This echoes the earlier arguments noted above that, particularly in metal-finishing processes, machines can substitute for skilled labor and foreman supervision in ensuring a high, uniform quality standard.31 Other process studies either claim that quality need not be affected by technique or neglect to mention the problem. Again, we need to know more in this area.
Finally, on this last point, the process studies do not tell us enough about the other inputs into the production process. A few studies do account for the differential efficiency in the utilization of raw materials 27 The costs of containers and pipes tend to increase directly with surface area, which rises more slowly as dimensions increase than the volume enclosed 28 This assumes that, despite the dilemma, it is still within the LDC's comparative advantage to produce the item rather than import it. 29 And, of course, the small producer who expects volume to grow faces a yet crueler dilemma. 30 by different techniques.32 But it is difficult to tell if this is a serious problem generally. Further, how valid is the argument that mechanization is an efficient substitute for management supervisory skills? Unfortunately, there is only one piece of quantitative evidence on this point. Clague has shown that the overall efficiency of Peruvian industries relative to that of comparable U.S. industries increased as capital intensity increased; machine-paced processes seem to offer less latitude for labor inefficiency.33 The engineering and process studies have not thus far been able to quantify this, and so it must remain, with the exception of Clague's study, largely an open question. But Pack reminds us that high levels of mechanization will require skills necessary to repair the complex modern machinery, and these are usually as scarce in LDCs as the management skills that the machines are supposed to replace.34 The repair skills to handle simpler machinery, however, usually are in greater supply. Pack argues that good management is also needed in order to recognize the possibilities for labor-capital substitution and to do the necessary innovations to adapt equipment rather than just accept completely the sales pitch of the traveling capital-goods salesman from the United States, Europe, or Japan.
In all, the engineering and process-analysis studies do provide powerful demonstrations of the feasibility of labor-intensive methods and are probably more convincing than the econometric studies in the previous section, but the difficult questions of scale, quality, and skill still remain.
Anecdotal Evidence Under this category we group studies that report examples of laborcapital substitution but do not offer precisely quantified estimates of the frontier of efficient combinations in the way that the engineering studies do. These reports can nevertheless offer useful insights into the production processes.
The tal.35 During Japan's early industrialization, when wages were comparatively low, machinery in textiles and other industries were run faster and more intensively (extra shifts); this meant more frequent halts for repair, but repair was a labor-intensive activity. The overall effect was greater labor intensity and greater efficiency in the use of all resources. Thus even in processes in which mechanization was necessary for quality reasons, double and triple shifts greatly decreased the overall capitallabor ratio. Greater use was made of older, used equipment from the West. Raw-material inputs were modified so that more labor-intensive processes could be used. Ranis reports that similar capital-stretching, labor-intensive techniques are currently being used in Korea and Taiwan in textiles, electronics, woodworking, and other industries. He further points out that, even for products in which there may be technical rigidity in some main production processes, there are always peripheral processes like materials handling and packaging which can be done efficiently with labor-intensive methods, so that the overall production of the product still has scope for labor-capital substitution. virtually all cases, the researchers report that the greater labor intensity has taken place in response to the lower volumes and/or the lower wage rates of the LDCs. This kind of response (as opposed to, say, a report that greater labor intensity seems to have occurred at random) does tend to support the notion that these are efficient adaptations. Also, Ranis's examples include firms that were facing substantial competition, either internally or in export markets; again, there is a presumption that this would tend to be forcing efficient adaptations. Finally, Ranis, Pack, the ILO, and Strassmann connect the adaptations with good, flexible management; again this argues for efficient adaptation.
Similarly, Pack reports examples of labor-capital substitution in consumer-goods manufacturing in
The anecdotal evidence thus points in the same direction as the earlier evidence: Greater labor intensity is not only feasible but is in fact occurring in some LDCs. It does, however, seem to be closely tied to good management. small firms have adopted this greater labor intensity in response to the different factor prices that they face compared with large firms: cheaper labor and more expensive capital. This kind of response, they argue, shows that it is an efficient adaptation and hence that efficient factor substitution is quite feasible.
Big Firms versus Small Firms
But are the small firms efficient? A counterargument would run as follows: The small firms may have lower capital-labor ratios, but they are inefficient in the sense that they use more labor and more capital per unit of output than do large firms. They are still able to sell goods in the same market as the big firms, however, because their wage costs are so much lower; that is, because the labor markets are imperfect.39 Hence the greater labor intensity of the small firms is not necessarily an efficient adaptation.
The output-capital ratio of the small firms compared with the large firms is critical to deciding this point. But the evidence here is mixed, with different studies finding different results, even for the same country. 40 Unfortunately, truly valid comparisons between large and small firms are very difficult to construct. Not only must the same final product be produced by both firms, but they must be vertically integrated to the same extent. For example, suppose the large firms produce more of their own inputs or do more of their own distribution than do smaller firms. These extra activities probably involve different factor proportions than the main production processes that are being compared. Thus we could observe different capital-labor ratios and different output-capital ratios between large and small firms, even if the main production processes were identical, and might mistakenly conclude that these indicated differences in efficiency. None of the studies cited above has tried to correct for this problem. One corrective measure would be to recalculate the unit costs of both large and small firms, using social opportunity costs for all inputs; if small firms had lower unit costs measured in this fashion, we could then be confident that the greater labor intensity of the small firms was good evidence of efficient factor substitution. But these kinds of calculations are very difficult, and, of course, none of the studies has attempted them. Overall then, we can learn little from the comparisons between large and small firms. The latter are surely more labor-intensive, and this is very likely a response to expensive capital and cheap labor, but in the absence of competitive markets we simply cannot conclude anything about the efficiency of small firms.
Used Machinery
Secondhand machinery is frequently recommended as a way for LDCs to reduce capital-labor ratios. The theoretical argument runs as follows: Profit-maximizing firms should find it worthwhile to replace existing machinery with new machinery either (a) when there is enough technological improvement so that the average total costs of output produced by the new machines are below the marginal costs of output produced by old machines, or (b) in the absence of technological improvement, when the future discounted maintenance costs of old machines exceed the price of the new machines plus their future discounted maintenance costs. In both cases, replacement depends on comparing one set of costs that have a heavy labor weight with another set of costs that have a heavy capital element. Thus a high-wage economy will find it economically rational to replace machinery much sooner than would a low-wage economy, and low-wage LDCs should find worthwhile the purchase of used machines that developed countries find marginal. In the developed country, if there is an active market in used machinery, the price of the used machine would have to fall by enough for a developed-country buyer to find it worthwhile to consider the used machine as an economic alternative to the new machine. At that price, the LDC buyer will surely find the machine more worthwhile (except for added transportation costs) . 41 The counterargument (often presented by those who believe in fixed proportions) is that good markets in used machines do not exist, used machines are a very risky proposition, spare parts may not be available, or the machinery is so technologically obsolete that the use of the machines is inefficient compared with new machines.
What is the evidence? First, it should be noted that organized markets in used machinery are present in the developed countries. Brokers, catalogs, and trade associations of used-machinery dealers do exist. Second, a number of studies have found efficient employment of used ma- 41 But if the productivity of the used machine falls so low that its price is simply its scrap value in the developed country, it may or may not be a good buy for the LDC. capital.52 Radhu also finds foreign firms to be more capital-intensive than locally owned Pakistani firms.53 But Cohen finds no significant differences between foreign and Korean firms producing for export markets.54 The evidence is clearly mixed. Although the MNCs may not be the heroes of appropriate technology, they are far from the villains that many make them out to be. They have the management expertise, and they are frequently willing to use it to adapt to labor-intensive processes. Again, there is adequate evidence of factor substitutability.
Factor Proportions and Savings Rates
An argument cited earlier in favor of capital-intensive methods is that they would raise the income share of capital owners who are supposed to have higher rates of saving and reinvestment than do workers; the pace of industrialization would thereby be quickened. This kind of argument, of course, presupposes that government taxation of labor incomes for savings purposes is not feasible.
But ignoring this, what do we know about savings rates?
The evidence reviewed by Mikesell and Zinser does indicate that saving out of labor income is very low; the marginal propensity to save rises with income, and the saving rate out of profits is high.55 But Oshima argues that added income to low-wage workers might reduce the dissaving of many.56 If we turn to the saving rates of firms of different capital intensities, Ranis provides evidence that medium-size (less capital-intensive) firms have higher savings and reinvestment rates per unit of output than do large firms."' Appavadhanulu argues that small firms in India have higher saving rates than large firms.58
The evidence thus is somewhat mixed. And given the possibility of government taxation as a form of saving, the income distribution, saving, and reinvestment argument appears to be a weak reed on which the case for capital intensity might rest.
Product Substitution
Some researchers have argued that in addition to the wrong factor proportions being used the wrong products are being consumed.59 Consumer durables like automobiles, air conditioners, and washing machines have capital-intensive production technologies. More appropriate products and services, like bicycles, air coolers, and launderers, would be more labor-intensive. (We will leave the issue of the development of new products for LDCs for Sec. III.) Frequently it is claimed that this is the result of an inappropriate income distribution in LDCs-too heavily skewed toward the rich-and that a radical redistribution of income is necessary.
Though this last suggestion may be recommended on ethical grounds, it appears likely that income redistribution would have only a tiny effect on employment. This is the clear conclusion of the general equilibrium macroeconomic models that have recently been constructed for a number of LDCs.60
A less radical alternative would be simply to levy excise taxes on capital-intensive goods which have labor-intensive substitutes. For example, Indonesia taxes "modern" manufactured cigarettes more heavily than traditional kretek clove cigarettes. 61 Another way of encouraging the production of appropriate products is to orient the economy toward exports. Here, labor-intensive goods and processes will have a comparative advantage in world markets and hence will be the natural choice for LDCs. This is the path that the "success stories" of the East and Southeast Asia-Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore-and, to a lesser extent, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, have followed. 
A Summary on Factor Proportions
This section has summarized the available literature on the possibilities of labor-capital substitution in LDC manufacturing. Each subsection has presented one aspect of the evidence. By itself, each subsection may not appear entirely convincing. But together they paint a rather impressive picture. There seem to be plenty of opportunities for more labor-intensive methods to be used. And there seem to be opportunities for a more appropriate product mix. The ranges of choice are far from complete on both the production and product sides. The economist's smoothly curved production isoquant is rarely present. It is the task of research and development to increase the range of choice, a topic we shall tackle in Section III. But the claim of fixed coefficients, or even of a severely limited choice of efficient factor proportions, simply does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the introduction of production methods embodying inappropriate factor proportions in most LDCs. The rising real wages in LDC manufacturing sometimes receives two defenses; both should be put to rest. First, it is argued that wages should rise with the increases in productivity in manufacturing. Besides mixing cause with effect, this argument is wholly inappropriate for an economy with widespread un-and underemployment. As long as there is substitutability, greater capital shallowing should be encouraged through low wages; only when labor grows scarce should real wages rise in line with rising productivity. Second, it is argued that in a world of monopolistic MNCs which escape LDC taxes through internal transfer pricing vis-ai-vis the parent company, high wages may be the only way that the LDC can capture some of the profits. But the obvious solution to this is to improve government taxation and customs procedures and to reduce the MNC's monopoly power by introducing more competition (via imports, if necessary) into the domestic economy in which the MNC sells or by opening up for wider bidding the extraction and export concession that the MNC has. Using wages to try to capture those profits is a distinctly inferior and potentially quite harmful policy.
II. The Causes of Inappropriate Factor Proportions
The cheap-capital and high-wages policies have laudable goals-to encourage investment and to raise worker incomes-but their inevitable result is to encourage entrepreneurs to substitute away from labor-and toward capital-intensive processes. The econometric studies of the elasticity of substitution, if they are to be believed, certainly point in this direction. The engineering and process analysis studies tell the same story. And much of the anecdotal literature, analysis of small firms, and discussion of MNC adaptations do link changes in capital-labor ratios to relative factor prices.
Further, inappropriate factor prices make capital-intensive goods cheaper and labor-intensive goods more expensive, thus discouraging consumption of the latter. Not only wrong processes but also the wrong products are encouraged. 71 But factor prices do not seem to offer a complete explanation of the existence of inappropriate factor proportions. A second reason seems to be the strong tendency for entrepreneurs and especially engineers to think in terms of developed-country mechanized technology as the ideal, regardless of factor prices. The confusion between high labor productivity and efficiency enters here. If markets are noncompetitive, entrepreneurs seem willing to sacrifice some of their potential monopoly profits in order to achieve this goal of mechanization. Wells has labeled this the phenomenon of "engineering man."72 This appears to be a widely held notion. But there has been only one attempt formally to test the proposition. White found that greater competition in Pakistani product markets forced industrialists to adopt more labor-intensive methods relative to the U.S. "ideal"; industrialists in less competitive markets were freer to pursue their engineering goals. 73 Third, even in instances in which firms might be interested in more labor-intensive methods, and those methods do exist, information about them is frequently difficult to obtain. Search is costly, the firms are familiar with the capital-intensive processes, and the absence of compe- tition may reduce the incentive to search. Or even with search, they may simply fail to find out about the labor-intensive methods. 74 Fourth, not all MNCs adapt their technologies. There are plenty of "engineering men" in MNCs, and, if permitted by noncompetitive markets, they too will mechanize beyond socially optimal levels. Fifth, inappropriate government policies, beyond the labor and capital pricing policies and the failure to encourage competition mentioned above, are another contributing cause. Badly conceived, capitalintensive public projects are a waste of resources and surely do not provide a good example to the private sector. The mystique of high productivity and modernity pervades the public sector as much as it does the private sector.75 Other poor policies include a frequent negative attitude toward the import of used machinery and used vehicles, sometimes taking the form of outright bans.7" This is based on the belief that used machines are inferior and private entrepreneurs are mistaken in their purchases or that used machinery may be an easier vehicle for smuggling (through overinvoicing to smuggle funds out of the country or underinvoicing to reduce tariff duties, since the customs officials may be less familiar with the true value of the machinery). As argued above, such policies are sacrificing potential major improvements in labor-capital ratios." And the unwillingness to tax or otherwise discourage the consumption of capital-intensive consumer goods and the unwillingness of many governments to encourage the development of export markets for manufactured goods further push their economies toward capitalintensive methods.
In short, LDC government policies can go a long way in explaining the inappropriate factor proportions observed. 
III. The Evidence on Research and Development in LDCs
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Pressuring the MNCs to do more R & D in the LDCs is another approach. Countries might make this a condition of entry by the MNC. Again, appropriate factor prices and product taxation would certainly encourage this process, as would more competition in product markets. Indeed, much of the problem that LDCs face in paying too much for the transfer of technology (through excessive royalties, improper transfer prices on inputs, etc.) would disappear with a combination of tougher bargaining and a procompetitive (via import competition) policy that would reduce the potential profits that the MNCs could siphon away. The frequently described picture of helpless LDCs at the mercy of a handful of monopolistic MNCs is largely false.'00 Alternative suppliers of technology to achieve similar ends almost always exist, and LDC policymakers can and should be able to take advantage of this.101 Even in the world automobile industry, which exhibits tight oligopoly in domestic production in every-developed country, there are more than a dozen producers capable of LDC production.
Finally, the question of patents in LDCs combines the problem of incentives and MNCs. Patents provide a property right in an idea and thereby encourage the investment of resources (R & D) in the production of new ideas that would otherwise be copied at low or zero cost. But they do convey a monopoly on the idea. In LDCs the vast majority of patents are granted to foreigners, and only a tiny fraction of them are ever used in production in the LDC.102 Essentially, the patents largely protect foreign inventions from being copied domestically rather than encourage domestic invention. But the patent system does encourage some MNCs to produce in LDCs, which they otherwise would not do if they could not protect their products and processes.103 Although the publication of the patent in the developed country reveals the basic invention, nonpatentable proprietary confidential information is usually necessary to make the invention work. This is what the MNC frequently brings to the LDC, and the protection of the patent also protects this proprietary knowledge. The critical question, then, concerns the worth of a broad patent system that possibly encourages some domestic invention and some MNC investment but that also prevents domestic firms from using foreign-owned patented inventions that the foreigners are not using. There is simply no evidence to support strongly any conclusions. It is probably the case that a more selective system-for example, one that voided foreign-held patents after a period of domestic nonusewould be more worthwhile. ' The evidence also suggests that incentives matter. Appropriate factor prices are an important spur to the discovery and profitable use of appropriate factor proportions and appropriate products. Effective competition in product markets can also provide an important push in the right direction by leaving less scope for engineering instincts to dominate efficient factor use.
Large gaps, however, still remain in our knowledge of appropriate factor use. The microeconomic studies of efficient alternative factor proportions have been completed for only a handful of industries. It would be reassuring to have many more studies showing that alternatives exist. Also, these kinds of studies could profitably be focused on the auxiliary handling, packaging, transporting, and storage processes that figure prominently in the anecdotal examples of substitutability; again, it would be reassuring to have more precise estimates here. Further, we still do not understand very well the connection between scale effects and mechanization or the extent to which it is a genuine problem. The connection between quality standards and mechanization and the extent to which mechanization serves as a substitute for skilled processing labor and/or management supervisory skills are still largely unknown; most evidence here is still qualitative rather than quantitative. (But it cannot be emphasized too frequently that better utilization of existing capacity-multiple-shift work in particular-would greatly economize on existing and future capital investments,105 and that export markets can supplement small internal markets so as to achieve possible scale economies.) Finally, the connection between good management and the ability to recognize and utilize the opportunities for labor-capital substitution needs much greater exploration.
The conclusions of this paper point direcly to a number of policy implications. First, the establishment of proper factor prices is terrifically important. This has been a familiar refrain from economists over the past 10 years, but it can still bear repeating. The subsidies to capital use must be ended; an important part of this would be the replacement of exchange controls and overvalued exchange rates with realistic exchange rates. If wages in the urban modern sector cannot be decreased, at least their rates of increase must be substantially moderated in many countries. This is difficult to advocate since these wages are low by developed-country standards, but they are high by comparison with the incomes of the bulk of the remaining population in the LDCs, and the wage increases in the urban sector must necessarily reduce the potential for improving the incomes of the poorer majority. If these policies of altering relative factor prices are combined with procompetitive policies and more effective taxation policies, they need not imply a decrease in labor's share of output relative to capital's share.
With respect to the small-firm versus large-firm problem, efforts to provide special facilities or subsidies to small firms are probably unwise. It is easy to waste funds on unproductive projects in this area,106 and it would be a serious mistake to compound the current incentive errors by subsidizing capital for small firms. Rather, it would probably be quite adequate simply to give small firms unhindered access to resources; that is, to stop current discrimination against small firms and to let the processes of competition sort out the efficient and inefficient sizes. 107 The current exchange-control-and capital-funds-control regimes usually do quite the opposite. 108 The establishment of an industrial extension service 105 But recent analyses of shift work have pointed out that, at a given relative wage, the long-run capital-labor ratio in an industry could increase or decrease, depending on the elasticity of substitution and on any shift-work wage differential. The ambiguity occurs because multiple shift work lowers the effective costs of capital relative to labor, thus encouraging substitution of capital for labor as new facilities are built (see Gordon C. Winston, "Capital Utilization and Optimal Shift Work," Bangladesh Economic Review 2 [April 1974]: 515-58; and that would provide information on techniques and help solve problems for small businesses would probably be the best action that an LDC government could take.109 But, like research institutes, effective extension services are easy to describe in principle and difficult to make work in practice.
The policy toward used machinery should also be relatively neutral. Neither a strongly pro-nor anti-used-machinery policy seems warranted. Rather, reliance on the judgments of entrepreneurs-provided that the appropriate factor price and procompetition policies are pursued-is warranted. Again, an information service to help on those judgments would be worthwhile.
The appropriate factor price and procompetition policies, backed by some tougher bargaining by LDCs, would limit many of the possible abuses by MNCs.110 Taxation policies on inappropriate products and an outward-looking orientation that stressed labor-intensive exports would also help. And pressuring the MNCs to do more R & D in the LDCs is probably worthwhile.
Research institutes and information services, both national and international, are probably fruitful ways of encouraging more appropriate R & D by and for LDCs. But, again, describing the good research institute is much easier than operating it.
If the connection between good management and appropriate factor proportions is as crucial as much of the evidence suggests (with good management meaning that entrepreneurs can recognize and utilize the opportunities for appropriate factor proportions and also that supervisory skills may be able to substitute for mechanization in the maintenance of quality standards), then appropriate management-training institutes may be as (or more) important as appropriate R & D institutes for discovering and applying efficient labor-intensive methods.
Finally, a few words of caution: Appropriate technology is currently a fashionable topic of research and interest. There is, however, a serious risk. Appropriate technology is sometimes touted as a quick and easy way of raising LDC incomes to developed-country levels. Five or 10 years from now, after some (but not all) measures to encourage appropriate technology have been taken, many current enthusiasts will look around and notice that most of the people in LDCs are still very poor by devel- oped-country standards. They may then decide that appropriate technology was a fraud and will search for some other quick and easy solution. This would be unfortunate. Appropriate technology does not offer a simple solution to LDC problems; it cannot. There are no quick and easy solutions, short of a radical change in the relative supply-demand conditions for most natural resources, comparable with that which has occurred in oil.111 But appropriate technology can mean an improvement in the allocation of resources in LDCs, perhaps a slightly more equitable internal distribution of income, and more and better employment opportunities. The game should not be oversold, but it is definitely worth the candle. 
